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tHe eURoPoL CoUnCIL DeCIsIon: 
A neW LegAL BAsIs FoR eURoPoL*
alexandra de Moor** and Gert Vermeulen***
aBStraCt123
This article offers a thorough analysis of the legal basis of Europol over the years of its 
existence. Three eras are distinguished: the pre-Convention era, the Convention era and 
the post-Convention era. The succession of legal instruments represents choices 
embodying the development of Europol. The choices made are analysed and evaluated 
using four criteria: necessity, consistency, balance and transparency. By studying 
Europol’s legal basis simultaneous insight is gained into the lawmaking process under 
the third pillar of the EU. Here a distinction is made between the periods before and 
after the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, as well as between the periods 
before and after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon.
keywords: European police office; EU third pillar; EU criminal law; Europol 
Convention; Europol Council decision
* This article serves as a building block in the writing of a doctoral thesis in law (working title: 
Europol, quo vadis? Critical analysis and evaluation of the development of the European police 
office). Europol is thematically dissected into six clusters: legal basis; objective; competence; tasks; 
governance and control. on each of the six clusters, the choices made are analysed and evaluated 
using two sets of criteria, corresponding to two types of evaluation: product-evaluation (necessity, 
consistency and balance) and process-evaluation (transparency, professionalism). This paper is 
devoted to the first cluster ‘legal basis’. on the second cluster see, a. de Moor & G. Vermeulen, 
“Europol and the blurring of boundaries between law enforcement and public order”, in p. deelman 
et al (eds.), Cahier Politiestudies: Policing in Europe, antwerp, Maklu, 2010 (submitted for review). 
on the third cluster see, a. de Moor & G. Vermeulen, “Shaping the competence of Europol. an FBI 
perspective”, in M. Cools et al (eds.), Governance of Security Research Paper Series, antwerp-
apeldoorn-portland, Maklu, 2010, 63–99.
** academic assistant of Criminal Law at the Institute for International Research on Criminal Policy 
(UGent) – alexandra.deMoor@Ugent.be.
*** professor of Criminal Law – director of the Institute of International Research on Criminal Policy 
(UGent) – Gert.Vermeulen@Ugent.be.
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1. INtrodUCtIoN
The European police office (Europol) is the European Union (EU) law enforcement 
organisation that handles criminal intelligence. Its aim is to improve the effectiveness 
of cooperation between the authorities in the Member States (mainly police forces, 
immigration and customs authorities) competent for preventing and combating 
serious forms of international crime. Europol was created in 1995, on the basis of an 
established instrument of public international law, a convention between Member 
States (Europol Convention).1 It was the first organisation set up under the provisions 
of the treaty on European Union (tEU), introduced by the treaty of Maastricht.2 In 
1995 Europol stood alone as an institutional player in the third pillar and in terms of 
law enforcement cooperation had the most experience. The drawback was that the 
legal basis of Europol no longer reflected state of the art legislation. In the meantime 
other EU bodies and agencies dealing with security related issues had been set up by 
Council decisions, a legal instrument introduced by the treaty of amsterdam.3 In 
december 2006 the European Commission submitted a proposal to replace the 
Europol Convention by just such a Council decision.4 The Commission proposal was 
for long the subject of intense discussion, until after 15 months of negotiations the 
Member States reached a political agreement under the Slovenian presidency (JHa 
Council of 18 april 2008). Formal adoption was ultimately postponed from end of 
2008 to early 2009, due to a reservation of the Czech republic, which held the 
presidency in the first half of 2009. at its meeting of 6 april 2009 the Council of 
Justice and Home affairs Ministers (JHa Council)5 ultimately adopted the Council 
decision establishing the European police office (Europol), transforming Europol 
from an intergovernmental organisation into an EU agency (as from 1 January 
2010).6
The new Europol Council decision triggers a thorough analysis of the legal basis 
of Europol over the years of its existence. The succession of legal instruments represents 
choices embodying the development of Europol: from the Ministerial agreement in 
1993 via the Joint action and the Convention in 1995 to the Council decision in 2009 
1 oJ C 316, 27.11.1995, p. 1.
2 oJ C 191, 29.7.1992, p. 1.
3 oJ C 325, 24.12.2002, p. 5.
4 CoM (2006) 817 final of 20 december 2006.
5 The Council of the EU is the Union’s main decision-making body. The Council is made up of the 
ministers of the Member States. It meets in ten different configurations depending on the subject 
under discussion. The Justice and Home affairs configuration (JHa Council) brings together the 
ministers for justice, ministers for the interior and ministers for immigration. Throughout this 
article the words ‘Council’ and ‘JHa Council’ are used interchangeably.
6 oJ L 121, 15.5.2009, p. 37. See r. Genson & E. Buyssens, “La transformation d’Europol en agence de 
l’Union: regards sur un nouveau cadre juridique”, Revue du Marché Commun 2009, 525, 83–87. See 
also a. de Moor & G. Vermeulen, “Europol, quid novis? Kritische exploratie van het Europol-
Besluit”, Panopticon 2010, 1, 20–45.
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and a possible regulation in the near future. The model chosen for analysis and 
evaluation consists of eras and criteria. In three parts, Three eras are covered in three 
parts and for each the legal basis of Europol is examined more closely: the pre-
Convention era (§2), the Convention era (§3) and the post-Convention era (§4). The 
choices made are analysed and evaluated using four criteria: necessity, consistency, 
balance and transparency. In this article, as well as in the phd research on which it is 
based, the criteria are operationalised as follows. Necessity means at least offering an 
added-value or corresponding to an identifiable need. Consistency implies 
correspondence among related aspects, within the third pillar and even cross-pillar. 
Balance relates to the comparison of the by no means necessarily irreconcilable 
interests of efficient law enforcement and adequate legal protection. The degree of 
transparency with which negotiations were carried out is another important measure. 
The main findings on these criteria are compiled in the conclusion (§5). By studying 
Europol’s legal basis, the primary goal, insight is simultaneously gained into the 
lawmaking process under the third pillar of the EU, the secondary goal.7 This explains 
the two-fold structure of the three core parts: with Europol’s legal basis, first, and EU 
lawmaking, second. Here a clear distinction is apparent between the periods before 
and after the entry into force of the treaty of amsterdam, as well as between the 
periods before and after the entry into force of the treaty of Lisbon.8 although this is 
largely a retrospective exercise, it also facilitates discussion of future tracks, the new 
Europol Council decision being by no means the end of the development of Europol.
2. tHE prE-CoNVENtIoN Era
2.1. tHE EUropoL LEGaL BaSIS
The acknowledged forerunner of Europol was the intergovernmental cooperation 
under the auspices of trEVI (terrorism, radicalism, Extremism and International 
Violence), which took place at the margins of the European Community (EC) from 
the mid seventies until the early nineties.9 Unlike Europol, trEVI was not an 
institution. It operated instead around a system of confidential meetings where good 
practice, experiences and initiatives were debated and disseminated. In 1975 the 
7 See e.g. E. Guild, “The Constitutional consequences of lawmaking in the third pillar of the European 
Union”, in p. Craig & C. Harlow (eds.), Lawmaking in the European Union, London, Kluwer law 
international, 1998, 65–88.
8 oJ C 306, 17.12.2007, p. 1.
9 See M. anderson et al, Policing the European Union, oxford, Clarendon press, 1995; t. Bunyan, 
TREvI, Europol and the European State, Statewatch, 1993. retrieved at: www.statewatch.org/news/
handbook-trevi.pdf (15.3.2010); C. Fijnaut, “policing Western Europe: Interpol, trEVI and 
Europol”, Police Studies 1995, 3, 101–106.
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European Council10 decided that the Ministers of Justice and Home affairs of the 12 
EC Member States should meet at regular intervals to discuss internal security and 
the maintenance of public order. Several working groups were established over the 
years. trEVI 1 specialized in the fight against terrorism. trEVI 2 had several roles, 
most notably overseeing the exchange of information in relation to the maintenance 
of public order and the harmonisation of police equipment and training. trEVI 3 
encouraged and supported the international fight against organized crime. drug 
trafficking was one of its major concerns. trEVI 4 dealt with safety and security at 
nuclear installations and transport. after the signing of the Single European act11 a 
particular group, known as trEVI ’92, was formed to look into the means of 
compensating for the expected lack of security as a consequence of the completion by 
31 december 1992 of the internal market. What was the rationale behind this? In ‘an 
area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services 
and capital is ensured’, the free movement of persons would notably entail the free 
movement of criminals. The ad Hoc Working Group on Europol was set up in august 
1991 and took over part of trEVI 3 and trEVI ’92. It paved the way for the 
establishment of Europol.
to the attentive observer it came as no surprise when at the Luxembourg European 
Council of 28–29 June 1991Germany proposed the creation of a European Criminal 
Investigation office.12 This had always been the dream of former German Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl13, who was in fact promoting the idea of a European Federal police, 
modelled on the american FBI.14 Half a year later, at the European Council of 
9–10 december 1991 in Maastricht, a modified proposal was formally adopted to the 
effect that a European police office (Europol) should be recognized under the new 
Justice and Home affairs (JHa) title of the equally new treaty on European Union 
(tEU). The tEU was signed in Maastricht on 7 February 1992. It entered into force on 
1 November 1993 and marked a new step in European integration. The treaty of 
Maastricht, which established the European Union (EU), divided EU policies into 
three main areas referred to as ‘pillars’. The supranational first pillar (European 
Communities) was complemented by the intergovernmental second (Common 
Foreign and Security policy) and third (Cooperation in the Fields of Justice and Home 
affairs) pillars. Why have three pillars in the first place? The reason was that Member 
10 as distinct from the Council of the EU (supra note 5), the European Council brings together Heads 
of State or Government of the Member States to give general political guidance.
11 oJ. L 169, 26.9.1987, p. 1.
12 C. Fijnaut, “om de toekomst van Europol”, Delikt en delinkwent, 1994, 5, 443.
13 “Wir brauchen eine schlagkräftige europäischen Polizeitruppe, die quer durch unseren Kontinent 
verbrecher verfolgen darf ” (“We need a decisive European police force, competent to prosecute 
criminals throughout our continent”), Focus 1994, 34, 19.
14 See J. Ellerman, Europol und FBI. Probleme und Perspektiven, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2005. See also 
a. de Moor & G. Vermeulen, “Shaping the competence of Europol. an FBI perspective”, in M. 
Cools et al (eds), GofS Research Paper Series, antwerp-apeldoorn-portland, Maklu, 2010, 63–94.
alexandra de Moor and Gert Vermeulen
182 Intersentia
States took the view that JHa cooperation and foreign policy cooperation were issues 
so central to their sovereignty that the supranational approach of and to Community 
law had to be abandoned.15
art. K. tEU brought JHa cooperation out of the shadows of European integration, 
formally establishing it as a part of the EU. art. K.1 tEU, the core provision of title 
VI (provisions on Cooperation in the Fields of Justice and Home affairs) provided 
that Member States would consider as a matter of common interest inter alia: ‘9. police 
cooperation for the purposes of preventing and combating terrorism, unlawful drug 
trafficking and other serious forms of crime, including if necessary certain aspects of 
customs cooperation, in connection with the organization of a Union-wide system for 
exchanging information within a European police office (Europol)’.16 a critical note: 
it was not until the Council adopted the Joint action of 10 March 199517 that Europol 
– or rather its predecessor the Europol drugs Unit (EdU) – was formally housed in 
the third pillar.
The initial legal basis of the EdU was the Ministerial agreement on the 
establishment of the Europol drugs Unit, signed in Copenhagen on 2 July 1993.18 The 
text had been drafted by the ad Hoc Working Group on Europol (supra) and intended 
to give Europol some substance, in anticipation of a proper legal basis. The trEVI 
Ministers had in fact agreed on a step-by-step creation of Europol, beginning with a 
drugs intelligence unit, which would then be further developed. The EdU, which 
formed the nucleus of Europol, started off in 1993 with competence for illicit drug 
trafficking where the criminal organisations involved and associated money laundering 
activities affected two or more Member States. In anticipation of a Europol Convention, 
about which agreement could not be reached at that time, the Essen European Council 
of 9–10 december 1994 decided to extend the EdU’s initial competence to the fight 
against illegal trade in radioactive and nuclear materials, crimes involving clandestine 
immigration networks, illegal vehicle trafficking and associated money-laundering 
operations. although the extension was formalized in the 1995 Joint action, the fact 
that in the absence of agreement on a Europol Convention, the EdU had been set to 
15 S. peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law, Harlow, Longman, 2000, 13.
16 other matters of common interest in art. K.1 tEU: “1. asylum policy; 2. rules governing the crossing 
by persons of the external borders of the Member States and the exercise of controls thereon; 3. 
immigration policy and policy regarding nationals of third countries: (a) conditions of entry and 
movement by nationals of third countries on the territory of Member States; (b) conditions of 
residence by nationals of third countries on the territory of Member States, including family reunion 
and access to employment; (c) combating unauthorized immigration, residence and work by 
nationals of third countries on the territory of Member States; 4. combating drug addiction in so far 
as this is not covered by 7 to 9; 5. combating fraud on an international scale in so far as this is not 
covered by 7 to 9; 6. judicial co-operation in civil matters; 7. judicial co-operation in criminal 
matters; 8. customs co-operation.”
17 oJ L 62 of 20.3.1995, p. 1.
18 t. Bunyan, Key texts on Justice and Home Affairs in the European Union: 1976–1993, London, 
Statewatch, 1997.
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work with an extended mandate on the mere basis of non-binding agreements among 
Ministers, with no legal force whatsoever, was described as unsatisfactory.19
The 1995 Joint action was equally controversial. at a stroke the remit of the EdU 
had been extended from one area of crime to four, without any reference to the 
European or national parliaments and without any justification whatsoever. It was a 
move described by EdU/Europol director Storbeck as ‘a legally and politically relative 
simple extension of the ministerial agreement’.20 Under the 1995 Joint action the 
EdU acted as ‘a non-operational21 team for the exchange and analysis of information 
and intelligence’ (art. 2 (2) Joint action). The objective of the EdU was to help the 
police and other competent agencies to combat the criminal activities within its scope 
more effectively within and between Member States. The Member States’ liaison 
officers and the EdU analysts joined forces in The Hague (NL). The essential feature 
of the EdU was that no personal information could be centrally stored, whether 
automatically or otherwise (art. 4 (2) Joint action).22 For the establishment of actual 
databases at Europol a convention was a legal prerequisite, for obvious reasons of data 
protection and privacy.
2.2. EU LaWMaKING: MaaStrICHt
How does Europol’s legal basis fit in with the lawmaking in the third pillar of the EU? 
Both the EdU Joint action and the Europol Convention featured on the list of third 
pillar legal instruments introduced by art. K.3 tEU.23 The third pillar as formalized 
at Maastricht was given a special set of legal instruments distinct from Community 
law: the first pillar legal instruments – directives, regulations and decisions – did not 
apply. The distinct names of the instruments served to emphasize the difference in 
nature of the third pillar competences vis-à-vis the Community competences.24 art. 
19 a. Klip, “United Kingdom: report on the draft Europol Convention by the House of Lords”, 
International Enforcement Law Reporter 1995, 6, 235–236; House of Lords, Select Committee on the 
European Communities, Report on the Draft Europol Convention, 1995. retrieved at www.fecl.org/
circular/3401.htm (15.3.2010).
20 t. Bunyan, The Europol Convention, London, Statewatch, 1995, 4. retrieved at www.statewatch.org/
docbin/europol-pamphlet-1995.pdf (15.3.2010).
21 only when Europol was enabled to participate – albeit in a support capacity – in the activities of 
joint investigation teams (infra), the organisation was released from its operational isolation, i.e. its 
isolation from operations ‘on the ground’.
22 F.r. Monaco, ‘Europol: the culmination of the European Union’s international police efforts’, 
Fordham International Law Journal, 1995, 1, 281; W. Bruggeman, ‘Europol – Wanted or tolerated?’, 
in J.a. Winter et al (eds.), Reforming the Treaty on European Union – The Legal Debate, The Hague, 
Kluwer Law International, 1996, 439.
23 See d. o’Keefe, ‘recasting the Third pillar’, Common Market Law Rev 1995, 4, 893–920; p. Müller-
Graft, ‘The Legal Bases of the Third pillar and its position in the framework of the Union treaty’, 
Common Market Law Review 1994, 3, 493–510.
24 K. Lenaerts & M. desomer, ‘towards a hierarchy of legal acts in the European Union? Simplification 
of legal instruments and procedures’, European Law Journal 2005, 6, 747.
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K.3 (2) (a) allowed the Council to adopt ‘joint positions’ and promote cooperation 
contributing to the Union’s objectives. art. K.3 (2) (b) allowed for the adoption of a 
‘joint action’ where the Union’s objectives could be better achieved by joint action 
than by Member States acting alone. art. K.3 (2) (c) referred to ‘conventions’, which 
the Council was to draw up and then recommend to the Member States for adoption 
in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.
a major problem with regard to these legal instruments was that their legally 
binding character had not been explicitly determined, with the exception perhaps of 
the convention.25 The convention was an established instrument of public international 
law26, so there was no doubt that conventions, and the measures implementing them, 
were binding on the Member States at international level. However, it was up to each 
Member State to determine the legal effect of a convention in national law.27 There was 
no indication whether joint positions and joint actions were to be binding or not. 
Thirteen Member States backed the view of the Legal Service of the Council that all 
joint actions were ‘obligatory in law and that the extent of the obligation on the 
Member States depends on the content and the terms of each Joint action’, but the 
United Kingdom (UK) and portugal argued that they ‘were not automatically… legally 
binding… the whole question of whether [a joint action] was legally binding depended 
on its actual text’.28 also in the attendant literature there was a controversy over their 
legal effect.29
at that stage of the European integration process, the choice for inter-state 
conventions – rather than the more incisive legal instruments of the first pillar – was 
clearly inspired by the wish to preserve Member State control over the adoption of 
these instruments.30 It is instructive to look at the legal output under the Maastricht 
era third pillar. In the years following the entry into force of the treaty of Maastricht, 
a large number of such conventions were concluded31, but only one of these actually 
25 See M. den Boer, Taming the Third Pillar: Improving the Management of Justice and Home Affairs 
Cooperation in the EU, Maastricht, European Institute of public administration, 1998, 29; r. 
Fernhout, “Justice and Home affairs: immigration and asylum policy. From JHa co-operation to 
communitarisation”, in J.a. Winter et al (eds.), Reforming the Treaty on European Union – The Legal 
Debate, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1996, 385.
26 Vienna Convention on the Law of treaties of 23 May 1969, United Nations treaty Series, Vol. 1155, 
p. 331. See a. aust, Modern treaty law and practice, Cambridge, Cambridge University press, 2007.
27 S. peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law, 18.
28 Council document 6684/95 of 4 May 1995 (outcome of proceedings of K.4 Committee of 7 april 
1995).
29 See the different views of d. o’Keefe (“recasting the Third pillar”) and p. Müller-Graft (“The Legal 
Bases of the Third pillar and its position in the framework of the Union treaty”).
30 B. de Witte, “International Law as a tool for the European Union”, European Constitutional Law 
Review 2009, 5, 273.
31 ten Conventions were agreed by the end of 1998 (oJ C 78, 30.3.1995, p. 1; oJ C 316, 27.11.1995, p. 1; 
oJ C 316, 27.11.1995, p. 33; oJ C 316, 27.11.1995, p. 48; oJ C 313, 23.10.1996, p. 11; oJ C 261, 27.8.1997, 
p. 1; oJ C 195, 25.6.1997, p. 1; oJ C 24, 23.1.1998, p.1; oJ C 221, 16.7.1998, p. 1; oJ C 216, 10.7.1998, 
p. 1). Five protocols conferring jurisdiction on the Court of Justice of the European Communities 
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entered into force during that period, namely the Europol Convention. Each 
Convention or protocol was in the standard form of an agreement between Member 
States annexed to the Council act drawing it up and recommending its acceptance. 
The first joint action was not agreed until december 1994 and only a handful of joint 
actions were agreed before autumn 1996. after that, the pace picked up and in total 
about thirty-nine were agreed under the Maastricht era third pillar.32
art. K.3 (2) provided for the Council as an EU institution, rather than the Member 
States, to adopt the third pillar legal instruments, with the exception of conventions. 
Unlike in the first pillar, there was no Commission monopoly on proposals. The 
Commission was given non-exclusive power to make proposals, along with the 
Member States in the first six areas of common interest (supra). For the remaining 
three areas (judicial cooperation in criminal matters, customs cooperation and police 
cooperation, including Europol), the Member States had an exclusive right of initiative. 
This would change fundamentally after the entry into force of the treaty of amsterdam 
(infra).
3. tHE CoNVENtIoN Era
3.1. tHE EUropoL LEGaL BaSIS
The Europol Convention was drawn up in secret by members of the Working Group 
on Europol comprising interior ministry officials and police officers. at no stage was 
the European parliament even consulted during the two years of negotiations on the 
Convention’s content, although article K.6 tEU explicitly stated that the Council 
should ‘consult’ the European parliament ‘on the principal aspects of activities’ to 
ensure its ‘views’ are ‘duly taken into consideration’.33 This, many Members of 
parliament believed, was reminiscent of the pre-tEU days when negotiations were 
carried out by a small group of bureaucratic elites behind closed doors.34 The European 
parliament nonetheless initiated post facto examinations on the Europol Convention, 
despite the failure to consult it.35
Initial delays in the drafting of the Europol Convention were related to unresolved 
dilemmas about Europol’s objective and remit, the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice 
were also agreed (oJ C 299, 9.10.1996, p. 1; oJ C 151, 20.5.1997, p. 1; oJ C 151, 20.5.1997, p. 15; oJ C 
261, 27.8.1997, p. 18; oJ C 221, 16.7.1998, p. 19) as well as four other protocols (oJ C 313, 23.10.1996, 
p. 1; oJ C 221, 19.7.1997, p. 1; oJ C 221, 19.7.1997, p. 11; oJ C 91, 31.3.1999, p. 1).
32 See S. peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law, 28.
33 t. Bunyan, The Europol Convention, 1.
34 V. Flynn, “Europol, a watershed in EU law enforcement cooperation?”, in G. Barrett (ed.), Justice 
cooperation in the EU: the creation of a European legal space, dublin, Institute of European affairs, 
1998, 91.
35 See resolution of 19 May 1995 on the Europol Convention, oJ C 151, 19.6.1995, p. 376; resolution of 
13 March 1996 on Europol, oJ C 96, 1.4.1996, p. 288.
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of the European Communities, the level of access to sensitive data in Europol’s 
databases and the conditions under which executive powers could be attached to 
Europol in the future.36 The Europol Convention was eventually signed on 26 July 
1995, without resolving the dispute over the Court of Justice. The vast majority of 
Member States supported a role for the Court, yet the UK steadfastly opposed it.37 It 
was not until the Florence European Council of 21–22 June 1996 that the outstanding 
problem was solved, enabling the Court of Justice to give a preliminary ruling on the 
interpretation of the Europol Convention, by virtue of an optional protocol to the 
Europol Convention.38 The Court of Justice, like the Commission and the European 
parliament, had a truncated role in the third pillar.39 It is often asserted that the Court 
had no jurisdiction, but it is more correct to say that the Court had no mandatory 
jurisdiction (cfr. The optional protocol).40 Under art. K.3 (2) (c) in fine tEU it could 
be given jurisdiction to interpret and settle disputes on the application of Conventions 
‘in accordance with such arrangements’ as each Convention might (or might not)41 
lay down.
The Europol Convention entered into force on 1 october 1998, after its adoption 
by the Member States in accordance with their constitutional requirements. However, 
it was not until 1 July 1999, following a number of legal acts related to the Europol 
Convention, that Europol commenced its activities as the EU law enforcement 
organization in full.
3.2. EU LaWMaKING: aMStErdaM
It may help to contextualise these developments again. The treaty of amsterdam of 
2 october 199742 brought a new dimension to cooperation in the fields of justice and 
home affairs. With the gradual transfer of policy on asylum, migration and judicial 
cooperation in civil matters from the third to the first pillar, title VI of the tEU was 
renamed ‘provisions on police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters’. The 
aspirations were wider, as it was now the Union’s objective ‘to provide citizens with a 
high level of safety within an area of freedom, security and justice’ (art. 29, §1 tEU). 
36 M. den Boer, “police cooperation in the tEU: tiger in a trojan horse?”, Common Market Law Review 
1995, 2, 569.
37 See V. Flynn, “Europol, a watershed in EU law enforcement cooperation?”, 93–94.
38 oJ C 299, 9.10.1996, p. 1. The Court of Justice was, however, left out of the protocol to the Europol 
Convention on the privileges and immunities of Europol staff, oJ C 221, 19.7.1997, p. 1.
39 The role of the Court of Justice was subject of a contentious debate. See S. Lavenex & W. Wallace, 
“Justice and Home affairs. towards a ‘European public order’?”, in H. Wallace et al (eds.), Policy-
making in the European Union, oxford, oxford University press, 2005, 466.
40 S. peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law, 18.
41 The Europol Convention did not prescribe the forum for resolving disputes between Member States 
on the interpretation or application of the Convention (see art. 40); the protocol to the Europol 
Convention conferring – facultative – jurisdiction to the Court of Justice did (see supra note 35).
42 oJ C 325, 25.12.2002, p. 1.
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This objective was to be achieved through ‘closer cooperation between police forces, 
customs authorities and other competent authorities in the Member States, both directly 
and through the European police office (Europol) in accordance with the provisions of 
articles 30 and 32’ (art. 29, §2, first indent tEU). art. 30 (1) tEU emphasized the 
importance of operational cooperation between the competent law enforcement 
authorities in the Member States. Europol was also confirmed in its role of ‘information 
broker’, i.e. facilitating the exchange of information, developing criminal intelligence 
and maintaining databases. In addition, art. 30 (2) tEU foresaw new tasks for Europol.
Within a period of five years after the entry into force of the treaty of amsterdam 
(1 May 1999 – 1 May 2004), Europol had to be enabled to facilitate and support the 
preparation, and to encourage the coordination and carrying out, of specific 
investigative actions by the competent authorities of the Member States, including 
operational actions of joint teams comprising representatives of Europol in a support 
capacity. Moreover, Europol had to be empowered to ask the competent authorities of 
the Member States to conduct and coordinate their investigations in specific cases. In 
November 2002 a protocol amending the Europol Convention in this sense was 
adopted, adding ‘participation in a support capacity in joint investigation teams’43 
and ‘making requests to initiate criminal investigations’ to the principal – information-
related – tasks of Europol.44 However, by the time this protocol – and two other 
amending protocols (200045, 200346) – finally entered into force (Spring 2007), a 
Commission proposal to replace the Europol Convention with a Europol Council 
decision was already on the negotiating table of the Council of Ministers.47 How did 
the convention become the ‘ugly duckling’ among third pillar legal instruments?
to answer this question, it helps to take stock of the new set of third pillar legal 
instruments introduced by the treaty of amsterdam. art. 34 (2) tEU became the key 
provision. Joint positions were retained, but re-baptized ‘common positions’. The joint 
action was abolished and replaced by two new instruments: ‘framework decisions’ 
and ‘decisions’. The difference with the past was that their purpose, binding character 
and implementation strength were made more explicit.48 Framework decisions are 
43 See a. de Moor, “The role of Europol in Joint Investigation teams. a Foretaste of an Executive 
European police office?”, in M. Cools et al (eds.), Governance of Security Research Paper Series – 
Readings On Criminal Justice, Criminal Law & Policing, antwerp, Maklu, 2009, 329–358; t. Schalken 
& M. pronk, “on Joint Investigation teams, Europol and Supervision of Their Joint actions”, 
European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 2002, 1, 70–82.
44 oJ C 312, 16.12.2002, p. 1.
45 oJ C 358, 13.12.2000, p. 1.
46 oJ C 2, 6.1.2004, p. 1.
47 See supra note 4.
48 M. den Boer, Taming the Third Pillar: Improving the Management of Justice and Home Affairs 
Cooperation in the EU, 31; S. Griller et al, The Treaty of Amsterdam. Facts. Analysis. Prospects, Wien, 
Springer, 2000, 486. See extensively, a. Hinarejos, “on the Legal Effects of Framework decisions 
and decisions: directly applicable, directly Effective, Self-Executing, Supreme?”, European Law 
Journal 2008, 5, 620–634.
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clearly related to first pillar directives.49 They have the purpose of ‘approximation of 
the laws and regulations of the Member States’ in the area of police and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters. They are playing an important role as an instrument 
for the harmonization of criminal law.50 Framework decisions are ‘binding upon the 
Member States as to the result to be achieved but shall leave to the national authorities 
the choice of form and methods’. It is explicitly stated, however, that they do not have 
direct effect. This exclusion of direct effect does not alter the fact that framework 
decisions, like directives, impose a duty on Member States to take all measures that 
are necessary for the correct and complete implementation at the national level. 
although the Commission cannot bring an infringement action before the Court of 
Justice for failure to implement (correctly) a framework decision, it has developed a 
system of monitoring and assessing Member State compliance in this area.51 
Furthermore, the Court of Justice held in the Pupino Case that the national courts 
have a duty to interpret implementing legislation in conformity with the framework 
decisions in order to give them their useful effect.52, 53 In addition to common positions 
and framework decisions, the third pillar uses decisions, which have a residual 
character: they may concern any other purpose that is consistent with the objectives 
of the third pillar, excluding the approximation of the laws and regulations of the 
Member States. decisions are binding, but also lack direct effect. In sum, as regards 
third pillar legal instruments only conventions may entail direct effect following 
adoption, ratification and entry into force54 and where its provisions have the required 
characteristics.55
49 For an exploration of the consequences of the similarities and differences between framework 
decisions and directives, see the opinion of advocate General Kokott of 11 November 2004 in Case 
C-105/03, Criminal Proceedings against Maria Pupino.
50 See a. Klip & H. Vander Wilt (eds.), Harmonisation and Harmonising Measures in Criminal Law, 
amsterdam, royal Netherlands academy of Science, 2002; E.J. Husabø & a. Strandbakken, 
Harmonization of criminal law in Europe, antwerp, Intersentia, 2005.
51 M. Borgers, ‘Implementing Framework decisions’, 44 CML Rev 5 (2007), 1361–1386.
52 Case C-105/03, Criminal Proceedings against Maria Pupino, Judgment of 16 May 2005. For a general 
overview of the Case, see M. Fletcher, “Extending “indirect effect” to the third pillar: the significance 
of pupino”, European Law Review 2005, 6, 862–877; C. Lebeck, “Sliding towards Supranationalism? 
The Constitutional Status of EU Framework decisions after Pupino”, German Law Journal 2007, 5, 
501–532.
53 The Court’s role was expanded significantly by the treaty of amsterdam (See art. 35 tEU). The 
Court is not merely competent to rule on the interpretation of conventions (supra), but also to give 
preliminary rulings on the validity and interpretation of framework decisions and decisions. Still, 
it remains a facultative jurisdiction, which is by no means comparable to first pillar jurisdiction.
54 Since the entry into force of the treaty of amsterdam, conventions enter into force, unless otherwise 
provided, once they have been adopted by at least half of the Member States (art. 34 (2) (d) §2 
tEU).
55 In order for a treaty to be self-executing and entail direct effect in the domestic legal order, its 
provisions must be clear, unconditional and not subject to discretionary implementing measures.
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What then of the legal output under the amsterdam era third pillar? The convention 
was shunned56, whereas an impressive list of (framework) decisions was produced by 
the swift decision-making machinery of the third pillar. The Council only had recourse 
to a convention on six occasions, including the three protocols to the Europol 
Convention.57 The Commission – now eagerly sharing the right of initiative with the 
Member States58 – never even bothered to propose the adoption of a convention. Even 
when human rights issues, such as data protection and privacy, were dealt with, the 
convention was disregarded.59 Europol was given a convention, Eurojust, Europol’s 
judicial counterpart, (only) a decision60, while they both collect and process extremely 
sensitive data. another example is CEpoL, the European police College.61 art. 34 
tEU does not say much about when a given instrument should be used. There is room 
for much discretion, leading to a lack of consistency in the choices made.62 With the 
Europol Council decision, Europol’s legal basis has been brought into line with the 
legal framework of other bodies working in the third pillar area, in particular Eurojust 
and CEpoL. Viewed in the light of third pillar consistency, we believe this is a change 
for the better.
4. tHE poSt-CoNVENtIoN Era
4.1. tHE EUropoL LEGaL BaSIS
The discussions on Europol’s legal basis were not new. as far back as 2001 the 
possibility of supplanting the Europol Convention by a Council decision was discussed 
by the Council, which led to a first draft of a Council decision replacing the Europol 
Convention.63 at that time it was decided to address the issue in the European 
56 M. Wasmeier, “artikel 34 Handlungsformen”, in H. von der Groeben & J. Schwarze (eds.), 
Kommentar zum vertrag über die Europäische Union und zur Gründnung der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaft, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2003, 385.
57 See supra notes 41, 42, 43. See also oJ C 197, 12.7.2000, p. 1; oJ C 326, 21.11.2001, p. 1; oJ C 139, 
13.6.2003, p. 1.
58 although the third pillar is said to be managed in an intergovernmental way, the increasing role of 
the Commission should alter this idea. See r. Lewis & d. Spence, ‘The Commission’s role in freedom, 
security and justice and the threat of terrorism’ in d. Spence (ed.), The European Commission, 
London, John Harper publishing, 2006.
59 See p. de Hert, “division of competences between national and European levels with regards to 
Justice and Home affairs”, in J. apap (ed.), Justice and home affairs in the EU: liberty and security 
issues after enlargement, (Elgar, 2004), 92.
60 oJ L 63, 6.3.2002, p. 1.
61 oJ L 256, 1.10.2005, p. 63.
62 J. Schutte, ‘de rechtsinstrumenten van de Europese Unie voor de ontwikkeling van Gezamenlijk 
optreden van de Lidstaten op het Gebied van politiële en Justitiële Samenwerking in Strafzaken’, 
Delikt en Delinkwent 2002, 7, 681–682 and 684.
63 Council document 8452/02 of 30 april 2002 (First draft of a Council decision replacing the Europol 
Convention).
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Convention and the subsequent Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), which prepared 
the treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe.64 Working Group x “Freedom, 
Security and Justice” of the European Convention recognized an urgent need for 
reform of the legal instruments available in the third pillar (art. 34 tEU) (supra) and 
recommended conventions already adopted to be converted into regulations or 
directives. For Europol, this operation would solve the pressing legal problems, which 
were making the development of its legal framework so cumbersome.65 The 
Constitutional treaty simplified the legal acts of the Union (art. I-33) and in this 
sense provided for a ‘European law’ on Europol (art. III-276). The fact that the 
Constitutional treaty would require a change to Europol’s legal framework was also 
recognized in the 2004 Hague programme.66 The Council was to adopt the European 
law on Europol as soon as possible after the entry into force of the Constitutional 
treaty and no later than 1 January 2008. as the Constitutional treaty was stalled 
following two negative referenda in France and the Netherlands in 2005, other ways 
were to be found to address the issue of Europol’s legal framework.
In the first half of 2006 the austrian presidency put Europol’s future firmly back 
on the political agenda.67 Starting with a discussion at the informal JHa Council in 
January 2006, followed by a High Level Conference on Europol’s future in February 
2006, the work continued through a number of meetings of a Friends of the presidency 
Group, resulting in a May 2006 options paper on ways to improve Europol’s 
functioning.68 a significant number of these required amendments to Europol’s legal 
framework. In its Conclusions on the future of Europol, the June 2006 JHa Council 
decided that ‘competent Council bodies should commence work in order to consider 
whether and how to replace by 1 January 2008, or as soon as possible thereafter, the 
Europol Convention by a Council decision as foreseen in article 34 (2) (c) where 
possible on the basis of a concrete initiative or proposal’ (Conclusion 4).69 The 
december 2006 JHa Council took note of the intention of the Commission to submit 
a proposal to this end (Conclusion 4). In december 2006 the Commission, true to its 
word, submitted its proposal for a Europol Council decision.
What are the advantages and disadvantages of each legal instrument? We made a 
critical comparison. The main advantage of a decision over a convention is that it is 
relatively easy to adapt to changing circumstances, because it does not require 
ratification. Contrary to conventions, that only become binding upon ratification by 
64 oJ C 310, 16.12.2004, p. 1.
65 Convention document 426/02 of 2 december 2002 (Final report of Working Group x “Freedom, 
Security and Justice”).
66 oJ C 53, 3.3.2005, p. 1.
67 Council document 5051/06 of 1 april 2006 (presidency programme on police and Judicial 
Co-operation).
68 Council document 9184/1/06 of 16 May 2006 (Friends of the presidency’s report to the Future of 
Europol).
69 Council document 9670/2/06 of 6 June 2006 (Council Conclusions on the future of Europol).
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the national governments after having been approved of by the national parliaments 
or the citizens via referendum, decisions do not need to be approved or ratified at the 
national level, even if they may well need implementation into or require amendment 
of national law. Whereas any amendment to a convention normally requires ratification 
by all signatory parties, changes to a decision can be decided directly by the Council 
(by unanimity) after mandatory consultation of the European parliament.70 The 
disadvantage is that the national parliaments are side-lined in this scenario. replacing 
the Europol Convention with the Europol Council decision would then reduce the 
power of national parliaments to control the development of Europol and would 
furthermore accelerate the pace of this development.71
The legal question may be formulated as follows:
i) was the Council able validly to re-establish Europol by way of a decision rather 
than by means of a convention; and
ii) ii) was a protocol abrogating the Europol Convention a legal prerequisite.?
For the Commission the choice of a decision was never under serious discussion; it 
was obvious. two further options were considered. The first option was to replace the 
Europol Convention by a Council decision and to propose at the same time a protocol 
to abrogate the Europol Convention, since there was a body of opinion holding that 
the entry into force of such a protocol would be necessary before a Europol Council 
decision could take effect.
The main disadvantage of this option was that such a protocol would itself have 
been an instrument requiring a long process of ratification by all the Member States. 
‘after careful legal analysis’, the Commission outlined its main reasons why such a 
protocol was not necessary.72 Firstly, there is no hierarchy between the different 
instruments put at the disposal of the Council through art. 34 (2) tEU. Secondly, the 
freedom of the EU legislator, as determined by primary treaty law, cannot be limited 
by provisions of secondary legislation, such as the Europol Convention, even though 
the latter does not provide for the possibility of being amended or a fortiori repealed 
by a decision of the Council (art. 43 juncto art. 45 Europol Convention). This 
conclusion is also borne out by public international law. a treaty can be made to expire 
at any time by the consent of all the parties. public international law does not require 
70 The treaty of amsterdam amplified the role of the European parliament with an obligation for the 
Council to consult the European parliament before adopting legally binding measures (See art. 39 
tEU). However, this remains largely cosmetic, as the Council can simply ignore the European 
parliament.
71 S. peers, Europol: the final step in the creation of an ‘Investigative and Operational’ European Police 
Force, Statewatch, 2007. retrieved at: www.statewatch.org/news/2007/jan/europol-analysis.pdf 
(15.3.2010).
72 SEC (2006) 851 of 21 June 2006 (Converting the Europol Convention into a Council decision – 
Legal analysis).
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the consent of the parties to respect a given form.73 and finally, the involvement of 
national parliaments is ensured through the national implementation procedures, 
which Member States will need to employ to give effect to the Europol Council 
decision.
after further discussions within the Council structures, the Commission’s position 
was supported by a very large majority of Member States, as well as by the Legal 
Service of the Council. on a critical note: for the latter this was a remarkable reversal, 
considering that in 2001 and 2002 the same legal service issued opinions stating the 
exact opposite74, namely that a Council decision replacing the Europol Convention 
could only have entered into force after the abrogation of the Europol Convention by 
a protocol, which would have required ratification by all Member States.
The Court of Justice would later confirm the Commission’s legal analysis with a 
similar line of reasoning in the Case Advocaten voor de wereld.75 This preliminary 
ruling confirmed the validity of the Framework decision on the European arrest 
Warrant76, providing for a simplified system for the surrender, as between judicial 
authorities, of convicted persons or suspects for the purpose of enforcing judgments 
or conducting criminal proceedings.77 Thus the Court ruled that art. 34 tEU did not 
establish any order of priority between the different instruments (framework decisions, 
decisions, conventions) listed in that provision, with the result that it could not be 
ruled out that the Council may have a choice between several instruments to regulate 
the same subject-matter.78 applied to Europol, it was then within the Council’s 
discretion to choose a decision as the preferred legal instrument, while it is true that 
Europol could equally have been the subject of another convention.
The Court did not rule on the actus contrarius argument raised by Advocaten voor 
de wereld, a non-profit-making association. according to classical actus contrarius 
doctrine an existing legal act may only be repealed by a new legal act of the same legal 
nature and quality. The applicants argued that only a measure of the same kind, i.e. a 
73 The Vienna Convention on the Law of treaties (see supra note 23), which governs the rules applicable 
to international agreements concluded between States in written form provides that ‘The termination 
of a treaty or the withdrawal of a party may take place: (a) in conformity with the provisions of the 
treaty; or (b) at any time by consent of all parties after consultation with the other contracting 
States’ (art. 54).
74 Council document 13875/01 of 13 November 2001 (procedure for amendment of the Europol 
Convention); Council document 11283/02 of 17 July 2002 (readoption of the Europol Convention 
by way of a Council decision as referred to in article 34(2)(c) tEU).
75 Case C-303/05, Advocaten voor de Wereld vZW v. Leden van de Ministerraad, Judgment of 3 May 
2007.
76 oJ L 190, 18.7.2002, p. 1.
77 See F. Geyer, “European arrest Warrant. Court of Justice of the European Communities. Judgment 
of 3 May 2007, Case C-303/05, advocaten voor de Wereld VZW v. Leden van de Ministerraad”, 
European Constitutional Law Review 2008, 4, 149–161.
78 See G. Vermeulen, “Vijftien jaar uniestrafrecht: verwezenlijkingen en perspectieven”, in J. Meeusen 
& G. Straetemans (eds.), Politionele en justitiële strafrechtelijke samenwerking in de Europese Unie. 
Welk evenwicht tussen vrijheid, veiligheid en rechtvaardigheid, antwerpen, Intersentia, 2007, 87.
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convention within the meaning of art. 34 (2) (d) tEU could validly derogate from a 
convention in force. The Court simply found that such an interpretation ‘would risk 
depriving of its essential effectiveness the Council’s recognized power to adopt 
framework decisions in the field previously governed by international conventions’.79
In light of the extended controversy that existed between the Commission’s and 
the Council’s Legal Service as to the conversion of the Europol Convention, one rather 
hoped for additional analysis by the Court – beyond relying on pure effectiveness, 
especially since the advocate-General had examined the issue in his opinion.80 
according to the advocate-General, the rule – which states that once a field has been 
governed by a particular type of provision it must always be governed by other 
provisions of the same rank, without any possibility of resorting to lower ranking 
provisions – cannot not be absolute, because it reflects an individual right in the 
context of relations between a sovereign power – the legislature – and another, 
essentially subordinate power – the executive – and their respective acts, namely laws 
and regulations. Therefore, it makes no sense to discuss that point because (framework) 
decisions and international conventions have the same legal basis and must pass 
through the same procedure, in that both must be approved unanimously by the 
Council, following a proposal from a Member State or the Commission and after 
consultation of the European parliament.
The actus contrarius doctrine was deemed inapplicable by the advocate General 
on purely formal grounds; looking at the essence of lawmaking in the third pillar 
could, however, lead to another conclusion. according to de Hert, it would be more 
respectful to Western political tradition to refer to the Council systematically as the 
Council of Ministers: ‘Members of the executive power jump scales and become the 
legislative power’.81
Even though the Council was able validly to re-establish Europol by way of the 
Europol Council decision, the Council’s choice may have serious consequences for 
the domestic effect of the instrument. decisions are binding, but lack any direct effect 
(supra). However, this does not exclude direct effect by virtue of domestic law. 
according to doctrine, national law in the EU Member States may lay down its own 
criteria for granting direct effect.82 take for instance, the information obligation of 
the Member States towards Europol, with exceptions (refusal grounds) only in 
particular cases. art. 8 (4) and (5) Europol Council decision are an exact copy of art. 
4 (4) and (5) Europol Convention. The content of the information obligation is taken 
79 See note 75, §42.
80 opinion of advocate General Colomer of 12 September 2006 in Case C-303/05, Advocaten voor de 
Wereld vZW v. Leden van de Ministerraad, §57–60.
81 See p. de Hert, “division of competences between national and European levels with regards to 
Justice and Home affairs”, 89.
82 a. van den Brink, Regelgeving in Nederland ter implementatie van EU-recht (Setting legal norms in 
the Netherlands for the implementation of European Union law), Erasmus Universiteit rotterdam, 
2004, 134.
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over entirely, yet its legal force remains unclear. according to the Europol Council 
decision the Member States are required merely to ensure that their national law 
conforms to this decision by the date of its application (art. 61 Europol Council 
decision). a perverse consequence of Europol’s new legal basis might very well be that 
the clear and unconditional information obligation ceases to be self-executing, thus 
differing from the position under the Europol Convention. Everything will therefore 
depend on the national implementing legislation of the Europol Council decision.
4.2. EU LaWMaKING: LISBoN
With the treaty of Lisbon it is hoped that discussions on the question of whether the 
appropriate legal instrument was used will now belong to the past. The reduction of 
the number of acts of the Union and the indication of the particular act with which 
the Union should legislate in each policy area, make the choice of act much clearer.83 
The treaty of Lisbon of 13 december 2007 amends the treaty on European Union 
(tEU) and the treaty establishing the European Community (tEC) and generates 
two separate, yet equal bodies of law: an amended version of the tEU and the treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (tFEU).84 The latter houses both the first 
and the third pillar, including Europol.
The legal instruments of the third pillar (common positions, framework decisions, 
decisions, conventions) will not be continued under the new regime. art. 288 tFEU 
(formerly art. 249 tEC) states that ‘to exercise the Union’s competences, the 
institutions shall adopt regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations and 
opinions’. a regulation has ‘general application. It shall be binding in its entirety and 
directly applicable in all Member States’. a directive is ‘binding, as to the result to be 
achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the 
national authorities the choice of form and methods’. art. 291 tFEU states in a general 
manner that Member States are to adopt all the measures of national law necessary to 
implement legally binding acts. The importance of a regulation for criminal law will 
increase when the Union uses the competences received in the tFEU, which 
distinguishes between the changes that Union law may bring to national criminal law 
and criminal procedure on the one hand, and the establishment of European offices 
(Europol, European public prosecutor’s office) and accompanying law on the other. 
The approximation of both substantive and procedural law will take place by means of 
directives. The establishment of Europol will find its basis as stated in art. 88 tFEU, 
which is an exact copy of art. III-276 Constitutional treaty.
The abolition of a legal instrument, raises the question of the transition from the 
old to the new system. What will happen to the legal acts adopted under the third 
83 a. Klip, European Criminal Law. An Integrative Approach, antwerp-oxford-portland, Intersentia, 
2009, 56.
84 oJ C 306, 17.12.2007, p. 1. The treaty of Lisbon entered into force on 1 december 2009.
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pillar before the entry into force of the treaty of Lisbon? Since the treaty of Lisbon, 
unlike the Constitutional treaty, does not repeal and replace the existing treaties, the 
general ‘succession and legal continuity’ article has also disappeared.85 Instead, there 
is a miscellaneous protocol on transitional provisions, whose very complicated title 
VII deals with the legal effects of the existing acts in the field of criminal justice and 
police co-operation.86 Basically, the intergovernmental characteristics of these acts 
will remain in place for another five years, unless such acts are amended within that 
period.87 This means that the Commission cannot bring a case against a Member 
State to the Court of Justice because of non-compliance. Similarly, the powers of the 
Court remain the same as before the treaty of Lisbon entered into force (art. 10 (1) 
protocol on transitional provisions). Should an act of the pre-Lisbon period be 
amended after the entry into force of the treaty of Lisbon, it will automatically fall 
within the new regime in which both the Commission and the Court are fully 
competent (art. 10 (2) protocol on transitional provisions ). The same will happen to 
all the remaining acts of the pre-Lisbon period, five years after the treaty of Lisbon 
has entered into force (art. 10 (3) protocol on transitional provisions).88
What then is the fate of the new Europol Council decision, now that art. 88 tFEU 
provides for the further development of Europol by means of regulations? In any case, 
there is no obligation to replace the Europol Council decision by a Europol regulation. 
There is merely an invitation addressed to the European parliament, the Council and 
the Commission to seek to adopt, in appropriate cases and as far as possible within the 
five-year transitional period, legal acts amending or replacing third pillar acts of the 
pre-Lisbon period.89
The European parliament, is a strong supporter of a Europol regulation.90 at 
present, the European parliament is still not sufficiently involved in the decision-
making processes covering third pillar policies.91 In the case of Europol, the Council 
merely consulted the European parliament on the Europol Council decision. The 
Lisbon treaty will – in principle – provide a single legislative procedure that guarantees 
85 art. I-437 Constitutional treaty: ‘The acts of the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies adopted 
on the basis of the treaties and acts repealed by article I-437 shall remain in force. Their legal effects 
shall be preserved until those acts are repealed, annulled and amended in implementation of this 
treaty’.
86 oJ C 306, 17.12.2007, p. 163.
87 B. de Witte, “Legal Instruments and Law-Making in the Lisbon treaty”, in S. Griller & J. Ziller 
(eds.), The Lisbon Treaty. EU Constitutionalism without a Constitutional Treaty?, Wien, Springer, 
2008, 90.
88 For a schematic reproduction, see a. Klip, European Criminal Law. An Integrative Approach, 124.
89 declaration concerning article 10 of the protocol on transitional provisions (oJ C 115, 9.5.2008, 
p. 354).
90 See W. de Bondt & a. de Moor, “de Europese Metamorfose? de implicaties van het Verdrag van 
Lissabon voor het Europees strafrecht”, Panopticon 2009, 1, 49.
91 See supra note 70.
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democratic accountability.92 art. 88 tFEU states that the European parliament and 
the Council, by means of regulations adopted in accordance with the ordinary 
legislative procedure, shall determine Europol’s structure, operation, field of action 
and tasks. The ordinary legislative procedure (art. 294 tFEU) is nothing but the 
co-decision procedure, consisting in the joint adoption by the European parliament 
and the Council of a regulation, directive or decision on a proposal from the 
Commission. However, for judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police 
cooperation (including Europol) the Commission still shares the right of initiative 
with a quarter of the Member States (art. 76 combined with art.289 tFEU). The 
European parliament sees its powers increase. This explains why the European 
parliament was eager to propose an amendment to revise the Europol Council 
decision within a period of six months following the entry into force of the treaty of 
Lisbon. The Council, however, did not adopt the revision clause from the January 
2008 legislative resolution on the proposal for a Europol Council decision.93 The 
European parliament would not give in. In November 2009, the Committee on Civil 
Liberties, Justice and Home affairs (LIBE Committee) rejected the text of four 
proposed Council decisions, implementing the Europol Council decision.94 In four 
legislative resolutions the European parliament considered that ‘without prejudice to 
the overall support for the European police office (Europol) and taking into account 
the imminent entry into force of the treaty of Lisbon and its effects on police 
cooperation, there should be no amendments to the measures implementing the 
Europol decision until such measures can be adopted under the new legal framework 
provided for in the treaty of Lisbon’. The Commission or the Council were also called 
upon to make a declaration on a proposal for a Europol regulation which is to be 
submitted six months following the date of entry into force of the treaty of Lisbon. 
Europol is not ill-disposed toward a new regulation, which would provide a remedy 
for some of the shortcomings of the Europol Council decision. We also believe this 
would be a change for the better, Viewed in the light of cross-pillar consistency, it is 
submitted that this would be a change for the better. In 2004 the European Border 
92 S. Carrera & F. Geyer, The Reform Treaty and Justice and Home Affairs: Implications for the Common 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, CEpS policy brief, No. 141, august 2007. retrieved at: www.
ceps.be/book/reform-treaty-justice-and-home-affairs-implications-common-area-freedom-
security-and-justice (15.3.2010).
93 European parliament legislative resolution of 17 January 2008 on the proposal for a Council 
decision establishing the European police office (p6_ta(2008)0015).
94 Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home affairs, Meeting 4–5 November 2009, Joint debate 
on Europol related files (LIBE(2009)1104_1). The draft Council decisions concerned: 1) Implementing 
rules governing Europol’s relations with partners, including the exchange of personal data and 
classified information; 2) rules of confidentiality of Europol information; 3) List of third States and 
organisations with which Europol shall conclude agreements; 4) Implementing rules for Europol 
analysis work files.
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agency, Frontex, was established on the basis of a Council regulation95, the first pillar 
equivalent of a Council decision, only with direct effect.96
5. CoNCLUSIoN
The new Europol Council decision triggered a thorough analysis of the legal basis of 
Europol over the years of its existence: from the Ministerial agreement in 1993 via the 
Joint action and the Convention in 1995 to the Council decision in 2009 and a 
possible regulation in the near future. The analysis has shown a recurrent necessity to 
adapt Europol’s legal basis. The essential feature of the EdU, which formed the nucleus 
of Europol, was that no personal data could be centrally stored on the basis of the 1995 
Joint action. For the establishment of actual databases at Europol a Europol 
Convention was a legal prerequisite, for obvious reasons of balance (data protection 
and privacy). pressing legal needs, gave way to more practical needs in the post-
Convention era. The disadvantage of replacing the Europol Convention with a Europol 
Council decision is that the national parliaments are side-lined, although according 
to the Commission the involvement of national parliaments would still be ensured 
through the national implementation procedures of the Europol Council decision. 
The main advantage of the Europol Council decision over a Europol Convention is 
that is relatively easy to adapt to changing circumstances, precisely because it does not 
require ratification. In the Convention-era the development of Europol could be 
described as painfully slow, while (European) Councils were urging the Member 
States to finalise the ratification of no less than three protocols. delays of up to seven 
years may not be tolerable, but this does not mean that the ratification procedures in 
the Member States and the consequent delays were not justified given the democratic 
processes in place.
Consistency proved to be a very pertinent criteria for analysis and evaluation. art. 
34 tEU, the catalogue of third pillar legal instruments for the amsterdam era, did not 
say much about when a given instrument should be used, which led to a lack of 
consistency in the choices made. Europol was given a convention, Eurojust and 
CEpoL only a decision. With the Europol Council decision, Europol’s legal basis is 
brought into line again with the legal framework of other bodies working in the third 
pillar area. This increases consistency in the third pillar. a possible Europol regulation 
in the near future would further increase cross-pillar consistency, as Europol and 
Frontex would then be placed on an equal legal footing, a regulation.
The making of the Europol Convention was not exactly a paragon of transparency. 
It was drawn up in secret. The European parliament was not even consulted. This was 
reminiscent of the trEVI-days when negotiations were carried out by a small group 
95 oJ L 349, 25.11.2004, p. 1.
96 K. Lenaerts & M. desomer, “towards a hierarchy of legal acts in the European Union? Simplification 
of legal instruments and procedures”, 748.
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of bureaucratic elites behind closed doors. also the fact that in the absence of an 
agreement on a Europol Convention, the EdU had been set to work with an extended 
mandate, without any reference to the European or national parliaments and without 
any justification whatsoever was described as unsatisfactory. The European parliament 
became increasingly involved in the further development of Europol, as its role was 
amplified by the treaty of amsterdam and even further by the treaty of Lisbon. The 
national parliaments, on the other hand, were seen more as an impediment to the 
further development of Europol during the Convention era. With the adoption of the 
Europol Council decision their role has been marginalized.
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